Alaska, the Sequel: Why Trump Wants Greenland
From Alaska to the NSR, Greenland is the next hinge of U.S. security and great‑power competition in the Arctic.
Greenland isn’t a real‑estate joke; it’s Alaska, the sequel. As the Arctic warms and the Northern Sea Route opens, Greenland becomes the hinge between Russia’s Arctic buildup, China’s faster logistics into the Atlantic, and America’s ability to keep its northern flank secure for the next 50 years.
Much has been written about President Trump’s desire to obtain Greenland for U.S. defense purposes of late, with many assessments framing the acquisition as “unhinged” or “unnecessary.”
Not surprisingly, the stated desire for the U.S. to control Greenland caused a major uproar within the EU, NATO, and of course Denmark. There was plenty of theater: a small EU troop deployment, barbs traded in Davos, and even jokes about armed dogsled teams taking on U.S. soldiers. Quite the week.
I make light of the above because, at the core of the Greenland phenomenon, is a real U.S. national security issue with historical precedent. There is a logical rationale for saying that the U.S. occupying or effectively controlling Greenland improves U.S. national security and, by extension, is good for the NATO alliance—or whatever comes after it.
At the core of the Greenland matter sit two high‑level considerations:
• Arctic security and U.S. security by extension
• Rare earth minerals
Much has been written about rare earths, so I won’t belabor those points here. They are important, but they are not the most important element of the Greenland campaign. Instead, I will focus on Arctic security in the context of U.S. national security and how real, observable developments have led Trump to seek more control over Greenland (again) in his second term.
To begin, a topic that doesn’t see much airtime in the Greenland discussion is the Northern Sea Route (NSR). The NSR is the Arctic shipping lane that runs along Russia’s northern coast, from the Barents/Kara Sea area in the west to the Bering Strait in the east. It connects Northern Europe to East Asia by cutting across the top of Siberia, making it the shortest sea route between those regions.
At the moment, the NSR is only reliably open for a few months a year and typically requires ice‑class ships and often icebreaker support. But as Arctic sea ice retreats, Russia is investing heavily to turn the NSR into a major commercial and strategic corridor for moving hydrocarbons, cargo, and potentially military assets between Europe and the Pacific much faster than via Suez.
As a result, Greenland is strategically important as, due to multiple factors, the expected warming of the Arctic and increasing navigability of the NSR over the next 20–30 years presents a security concern for the United States. In particular, as sea ice declines and the NSR becomes more reliably passable, China’s ability to move goods and military‑relevant equipment between East Asia, Russia, and even into the broader Western Hemisphere more quickly will increase, creating future economic and military challenges for the U.S.
It’s hard for people, generally, to think about strategic decision‑making 20 years out. However, if you intend for your country to survive another 20 years (or beyond), you have to be forward‑looking (as Russia has been in Siberia) to ensure your nation can adapt to the changing physical world. A clear example of U.S. long‑term strategic decision‑making is the acquisition of Alaska—which is also part of the Arctic.
America acquired Alaska from Russia on March 30th, 1867. At the time, the U.S. wanted to extend its territory into the Pacific Arctic, reduce British/Canadian reach into the Pacific (and thereby blunt Britain’s naval leverage), and gain resource and trade potential. Russia sold it after the Crimean War, under financial strain and out of fear that the British would take it for free—they knew they could not reasonably defend the territory. Selling to the U.S. created what was then a friendly buffer against British/Canadian encroachment and ensured Russia received some payment for land it might otherwise lose militarily.
Fast‑forward over 100 years and it appears that, while Russia made the best choice it could at the time, acquiring Alaska ended up being a strategic victory for the U.S. The U.S. gained significant territory and resources, improved strategic proximity to Russia, and preserved a durable buffer. The plan from over a century ago has played out quite well from the U.S. perspective.
Similar to Alaska, Greenland represents a major strategic opportunity. It creates a buffer between the Arctic and the United States, offers ground to install defensive and deterrent offensive capabilities in the region, contains rare earth minerals that are strategically valuable to the U.S., and helps close our Atlantic–Arctic flank. The key difference today is that we are building that moat primarily against Russia (and, by extension, China), rather than against the UK as in the 19th‑century Alaska context.
Bolstering that line of thought is the less discussed fact that U.S. and NATO presence in the Arctic materially lags Russia’s. Moscow has reopened or built dozens of Arctic military sites, refurbished multiple airbases, deployed specialized Arctic brigades, and operates by far the world’s largest icebreaker fleet, including new “combat icebreakers” that blend icebreaking with significant firepower. Russia also asserts expansive claims over Arctic waters and seabed, overlapping with other states’ exclusive economic zones.
Any loss of effective Western control or influence over Greenland would risk giving Russia (and potentially China in partnership) a far more advantageous forward position in the North Atlantic–Arctic gateway. That would move Russian sensors and potential weapon systems closer to North America, complicate NATO’s defense of key corridors like the GIUK Gap, and create a political wedge between the U.S. and key European allies by turning Greenland into a contested forward operating area rather than a shared strategic asset.
While Greenland and Alaska are not the same, nor are we seeking acquisition under matching circumstances, the general framework for why Greenland matters aligns closely. Alaska shows that, over time, protecting our Arctic flank is beneficial and creates opportunities we otherwise would not have. Greenland is likely no different when you think in multi‑decade terms.
One other thing, however, is nearly identical between Trump’s interest in Greenland and past U.S. interest in Alaska. William Henry Seward negotiated the Alaska deal in 1867. Seward himself was a GOP presidential contender who lost to a notable figure in world history: Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln brought Seward on as his Secretary of State, which led to Seward driving the Alaska acquisition process. At the time, the purchase was mocked as “Seward’s Folly” and “Seward’s Polar Bear Garden.” It was labeled useless, and Seward was accused of wasting taxpayer money or being corrupt. In hindsight, those labels look silly. Alaska is a strategic U.S. asset, and not having it would present serious vulnerabilities in the modern world.
Specifically, if we did not have Alaska, we would have a potential missile‑defense gap (NORAD), another major power on our flank (likely Russia), significantly weaker Arctic security positioning, the loss of important natural resources, and the loss of a strategic logistics hub. Alaska is important to U.S. national security, and the stated rationale for obtaining Greenland overlays the Alaska rationale closely—this time with the benefit of more than 150 years of hindsight.
Lastly, we must keep thinking about the future. History is littered with broken alliances. For the U.S. to continue to control its own destiny, it must be in a position to defend itself both now and into the future as geopolitical conditions change—which, on a long enough timeline, they almost certainly will. The acquisition or effective control of Greenland, then, is truly vital to the future of U.S. security, both domestically and in the Arctic region, if we intend to keep that control.
Some may read this as an apology for Trump or an endorsement of how the U.S. is going about obtaining this strategic asset—especially relative to how many in the press (and Trump himself) talk about it.
Not so. By understanding history, assessing long‑term strategy, and applying the lessons we have already paid for, Greenland becomes vitally important to U.S. strategic interests—and to the interests of its allies, whoever those allies may be in the future.
Welcome to Alaska, the sequel.
Hopefully the story will turn out just as well as last time.
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