Throughout the U.S.-Iran conflict, this publication has held one base case that remains intact:
Diplomacy will not produce a durable outcome unless the IRGC is degraded to the point that it is effectively eliminated as a controlling force, and is therefore willing to negotiate and make meaningful concessions.
Recent events continue to support that view of the conflict.
The pause initiated by President Trump last Friday and the short-lived ceasefire of the past weekend are already giving way to renewed fighting. Hostilities have resumed from the U.S., Iran, and proxies—Houthis in the Red Sea and IRGC-aligned Iraqi groups at minimum. Shipping has been harassed in multiple waterways and Saudi energy infrastructure has been targeted repeatedly. Iranian ballistic missiles were launched at a U.S. base in Jordan; with U.S. reports indicating they were intercepted. Saudi and American aircraft have struck Iranian-backed militia sites in eastern Iraq after drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities, expanding the fight further into Iraq.
None of this is surprising if one listens to the Iranians. They have been explicit about “jihad,” “resistance,” and revenge for some time. They have described an “offensive phase,” stated they will “fight to the last fighter,” denied that meaningful talks are underway, and rejected any arrangement that does not leave Iran in control of the Strait of Hormuz. That messaging should be taken at face value given Iran has come up behind their rhetoric with strikes and proxy expansion.
At this stage in the conflict, it is important to remember that this is not primarily a territorial or transactional dispute. It is an ideological conflict across both religious and economic lines for all parties involved. The IRGC views itself as the protector of “pure” Shia Islam in the Gulf and beyond with its purpose not being to reach a mutually beneficial equilibrium with the West or the GCC - by intentional design. Rather, its purpose is to preserve and expand a specific religious-political order. Any durable deal that reduces its coercive hold on the Strait, GCC energy flows, or regional alignment renders that project inert. The IRGC knows this and has logically (and consistently) acted accordingly. Negotiation only functions when both sides value compatible outcomes and seek to obtain them. For the IRGC, the welfare of the Iranian people is secondary if not tertiary to their ideology.
Western observers continue to misread this reality. The preferred Western outcome remains a deal, capital inflows, and a return to prosperous stability. That preference is understandable and not typically wrong in the sense that peace is a foundation of prosperity. It is also the product of an ideology of its own making: the post-Cold War professional consensus that violence is pathological, that conflict is a failure of process, and that sustained imposition of costs is illegitimate or unnecessary. Those instincts leave the West structurally exposed to an adversary that does not share any of those values as it pertains to the outcome of a military engagement. Your author writes from inside that professional class—I think, write, and manage capital for a living while possessing zero desire to see people killed, harmed, or held back from creating a better life for themselves and their family. That perspective is common across much of the American and Western educated classes, voting blocs, and now drilled into children from an early age. It is also the perspective that systematically discounts the seriousness of an enemy like Iran who is willing to execute protesters, strike commercial shipping, and fight to the last combatant.
The operational picture now makes the cost of that ideological mismatch clearer. Pre-war U.S. Patriot PAC-3 stocks stood near 2,330. By late July they had fallen to roughly 760–830, with THAAD similarly depleted. Meaningful replenishment does not arrive until 2029. Iranian drone and missile inventories far exceed interceptor capacity, and the U.S. typically expends multiple interceptors per inbound Iranian threat. The math favors the attacker, leaving the United States is spending multi-million-dollar munitions against relatively very low-cost drones and missiles (U.S. munitions that were never designed to engage low-cost, high-volume targets that didn’t exist when when it was developed). Iran has exploited this by striking more consistently and attempting to force a war of attrition in which U.S. bases eventually face thinner defensive screening. To that end, the U.S. has already acknowledged allowing some projectiles through in order to conserve ammunition.
This magazine mismatch is a real operational problem, but the larger problem is political and social will. Neither the administration nor the broader public appears prepared to meet an ideologically committed adversary on the terms the conflict actually requires. Iran understands this dynamic deeply and is already seeking to exploit it to the greatest degree possible - on all battlefronts. To wit, the result of that Iranian observation is expansion across multiple fronts—Houthis, Iraqi groups, the Red Sea, pressure on GCC states—while existing theaters with Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah remain active. Once several proxy actors with overlapping incentives are in motion, a clean pause becomes far harder to impose. Western restraint has been turned into a weapon against itself - an ideological battlefield of great importance that few give appropriate weight to.
The conflict is therefore entering a phase over which the United States and its allies will have materially less control unless they are prepared to engage more directly. Given the available information, these expectations appear reasonable:
The war widens further into Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, and additional theaters while pressure continues on GCC states. Broader international engagement is not off the table.
The United States may need operators on the ground to secure the Strait. Do not be surprised if that requirement arrives in the coming weeks or months. This would not be a mass invasion, but U.S. forces would likely need to operate on Iranian soil at some point in the conflict.
Attrition of U.S. equipment and personnel will occur and likely increase as the conflict expands. Losses of aircraft, drones, or sensitive kit should be treated as an expected cost, not a strategic shock. You must harden yourself against headlines. NHTSA data suggests that since the conflict with Iran began in March, we have lost somewhere between 13-15k U.S. citizens to automobile accidents against about 20 confirmed service member deaths tied to the conflict with Iran. This is not a comment on moral equivalency, it is a comment on scale. Be prepared for harsh but unsupported headlines.
Significant strikes on Iranian power, infrastructure, and denial networks supporting Strait control will likely be required.
More GCC states will adopt a more active retaliatory posture if they assess that Iran has been sufficiently degraded and the risk of severe retaliation has declined.
Escalation continues until IRGC-aligned entities and the IRGC itself are degraded enough that they cannot sustain the campaign. Full elimination of the IRGC is not U.S. doctrine and is not a near-term outcome, but the level of force required to create the brighter future for the Gulf and America will likely exceed what much of the American public is currently prepared to accept.
A durable off-ramp with this many actors remains unlikely unless the IRGC loses controlling power inside Iran—an outcome that is possible but not yet high enough probability to underwrite.
Achieving the stated objectives will require actions the American public is no longer conditioned to sustain. It is a return to the laws of nature - the strong will survive - which Western culture deeply rejects despite the logical truism in the statement.
There is one clear alternative: a managed declaration of U.S. victory followed by withdrawal. This publication has not abandoned its base case, but the political and social will required to remove the IRGC from a controlling position may not exist in sufficient quantity to realize the ambition. In an election environment, narrative management can blunt the immediate domestic cost while leaving the strategic consequences deferred. The Iranian people would be no better off, GCC nations would lose a more stable path, and the largest state sponsor of anti-Western terrorism would emerge emboldened and likely enriched. That would be objective failure, but it may be required to satisfy the domestic audience. Don’t assume the U.S. won’t simply quit.
The current U.S. administration has shown that one of its core philosophies is a willingness or desire to negotiate with terrorists. That stance marks a major departure from both Bush and Obama - and administrations prior. Absent a tougher and more consistent stance akin to those prior administrations, retreat and disengagement should be viewed as a reasonably probable outcome from a U.S. leadership stack that has a demonstrated desire to prioritize the U.S. equity market performance and optics over durable, long-term solutions. However, it does not yet read as the highest probability.
The 1963Macro base case remains intact: no durable resolution without definitive IRGC degradation to the point of capitulation.
As a result, fighting will continue until that happens, or the U.S. retreats.
Everything else is commentary.
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