Mohsen Rezaei, senior military advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, has warned that Iran will shift to full-scale offensive operations with no “political boundaries” if the United States continues its military campaign. In recent statements, he signaled a move away from limited retaliation toward higher-intensity actions, stating that no political border will provide security against Iranian forces if the pressure persists another two to three days.
This is not routine rhetoric. It reveals core Iranian operating assumptions about how a wider conflict would play out. Here we focus on the biggest one: the boomerang.
Iran appears to calculate that it can:
Impose sufficient costs on the U.S. and Israel through firepower, proxies, and asymmetric tools to deter or degrade sustained operations.
Strike non-U.S./Israeli targets (or energy infrastructure) in ways that GCC states will find politically untenable, leading them to expel U.S. forces, shun Israel, or withhold support.
Rely on Shia populations across the Gulf to create internal political or social backlash against any GCC participation in strikes on Iran, especially if Sunni-led governments take the lead.
These baselines drive the “no political boundaries” posture. But they rest on assumptions that may not hold once tested—particularly if Iran crosses lines that directly threaten the economic lifelines of mixed Sunni-Shia societies.
Why GCC hesitation has been rational so far
Arab Gulf states have long balanced real concerns: fluctuating U.S. political commitment, the risk of direct retaliation on their own energy infrastructure, and the broader destabilization of a region where regime survival depends on delivering prosperity and managing internal cohesion. All are legitimate.
But remove or override those constraints—through direct strikes on energy infrastructure or escalated actions that ignore “political” red lines—and the calculus shifts. The Strait of Hormuz and associated energy infrastructure are not peripheral; they are the heart of GCC economies. Today’s disputes center on shipping and Western alignment. Tomorrow, “non-compliance” could be defined far more broadly by Iran. Iranian willingness to weaponize the region’s economic lifeline for leverage creates an existential long-term threat that may outweigh short-term political optics.
The sectarian layer and the war inside the war
President Trump and others have repeatedly discussed “moderate voices” inside this conflict. While there are likely many moderates inside Iran, functional power remains with hardline elements. This aligns with Iran’s foundational role as self-appointed guardian of “pure” Shia Islam.
On balance, Sunni-led Gulf states have pursued more pragmatic engagement with the West—defense cooperation, foreign direct investment, and deeper societal integration. There is a spectrum inside both Sunni and Shia communities: not every Sunni embraces Western ties, and not every Shia rejects them. Yet the broader Sunni-led governance model has proven more compatible with global economic and security integration.
Shia communities are mixed throughout most GCC nations: a majority among Bahraini citizens (under a Sunni ruling family), roughly 30-40% in Kuwait, significant concentrations in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province (nationally 5-16%), and smaller but notable shares in the UAE and Qatar. Many of these populations view Iran—rhetorically and through networks—as a guardian of Shia interests and a pole of more traditionalist or “pure” Shia Islam.
An attack on Iran, particularly one involving Sunni-led states, can be received as an attack on the faith itself. This dynamic risks internal unrest, political fallout, or localized violence along religious lines—precisely the kind of internal flashpoint that “regional stability” language often euphemizes. Iran’s own leadership, deeply rooted in religious doctrine, frames external pressure similarly: strikes on Iran are strikes on the purest expression of Shia Islam that the Islamic Republic was built to defend. Sunni participation amplifies the perceived betrayal.
The secular Western lens often misses this. In much of the West, religious differences rarely drive organized violence or regime-level threats, and denominational conflict is negligible. Analyses therefore gravitate toward nukes, the Strait, missiles, and great-power stakes. Those matter. But they sit atop a deeper sectarian substrate that shapes how populations and leaders in the Gulf perceive legitimacy, threat, and acceptable costs.
The boomerang in practice
If Iran removes political constraints and strikes energy infrastructure across the region, we return to the starting point. GCC societies—already straddling Sunni and Shia populations—would face a stark choice: prioritize the stability and prosperity of their current mixed economies and social orders, or risk internal fracture to preserve Iran’s role as ideological guardian.
This is the boomerang. Actions meant to punish, deter, or force U.S./Israeli retreat could instead erode sympathy among GCC leadership and potentially among Shia communities if economic hardship follows. By extension, Iranian aggression against nearby GCC states could accelerate the very unification or active opposition Iran hopes to avoid. Iran has shown pragmatic restraint toward Saudi Arabia at times, partly due to the latter’s large Shia population and mutual religious considerations. But sustained economic damage changes the equation. Saudi (and broader GCC) calculations have always blended geopolitics, oil security, and regime survival with the sectarian overlay—not pure religious solidarity.
Signs of moderation exist: hosting U.S. bases, deepening Western business ties, and Vision 2030-style diversification point toward pragmatic, economically integrated paths. Iran’s regional influence, including its “Axis of Resistance” model, represents the more assertive, resistance-oriented pole. If Gulf nations—especially Saudi Arabia—openly join direct action against Iran alongside the U.S. to protect their economic lifeline and degrade Iranian missile/drone capabilities, it would be a notable tell. It would signal that “moderate” (pragmatic, state-interest-driven) voices are prevailing in shaping the regional order going forward. This is the outcome that Iran exists to prevent.
The larger ideological contest
This is not merely another round of U.S.-Iran escalation. As noted in prior analysis, we are in a war of ideology—one that extends beyond the West versus Iran. It is also an internal contest over the direction of Islam in the near-to-intermediate term: how much space will exist for the more traditionalist, resistance-oriented current that Iran embodies versus more pragmatic, economically outward-looking models?
The GCC’s response to Iranian overreach on energy infrastructure or political boundaries will provide a key data point. If broader coalition action materializes, it suggests the region is moving toward separating from—or at least containing—the most assertive fundamentalist expressions in favor of global integration. The opposite outcome entrenches the hard poles.
Iran’s current posture, as voiced by Rezaei, assumes its baselines will hold. They very well might—Iran has already demonstrated non-negligible destructive capability. However, the boomerang risk—economic pain activating sectarian fault lines and forcing societies to choose—suggests those assumptions deserve close scrutiny. The Strait, energy infrastructure, and the religious undercurrents beneath them remain the decisive terrain. How this plays out may shape not only immediate military outcomes but the longer-term ideological map of the Middle East.
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