Sunday Note: Before We Leave Iran Alone
Why, absent a shock, this will be our last word on Hormuz and why the base case still points to more strikes, not peace talks delivering a clean exit.
Look past the headlines about “progress” in Pakistan and a ten‑day ceasefire in Lebanon and the picture that emerges is stark: nothing material has changed in the fundamentals of the US–Iran confrontation. The mechanics still point toward more strikes, not fewer, even if nobody wants to say that out loud yet.
US red lines remain where they’ve been for weeks. Washington is demanding two structural concessions: verifiable, long‑term rollback of Iran’s nuclear program including surrender of its enriched uranium stockpile, and permanent, unrestricted freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz with no Iranian veto. Tehran, for its part, continues to describe those terms as “maximalist” and a “non‑starter,” publicly insisting enriched uranium is “as sacred as the nation’s soil” and ruling out shipping nuclear material abroad. You don’t need to be a diplomat to see the gap here is not narrowing.
Meanwhile, the operational picture is moving in only one direction. The US blockade remains active, a third carrier strike group is en route, mine‑countermeasure assets are flowing into theater, and heavy‑lift C‑17 activity into the region has, if anything, remained elevated. Iran has briefly “reopened” and then re‑closed the Strait, fired on commercial shipping, and leaned harder on its shadow fleet to keep discounted crude flowing to China. On the surface you have ceasefires and envoys; underneath, you have a reload window and a denial network that is still intact.
A Narrative Squeeze, Not a Peace Process
If there is a coherent strategy in Washington, it lives at the intersection of military leverage and information warfare. President Trump’s approach, at least as reported, is to keep talking as if a deal is “very close” while maintaining and even tightening the physical pressure. Sending Steve Witkoff, a trusted personal envoy but not a principal national‑security figure, back to Pakistan is part of that. If a breakthrough were genuinely imminent, you would expect principals in the room and a president eager to stand next to the signing ceremony, not an envoy round that can quietly fail.
The Israel–Lebanon angle fits the same pattern. The reporting that Netanyahu and his inner circle were “stunned” by Trump’s Truth Social declaration that Israel is “PROHIBITED” from bombing Lebanon further underscores how central optics are to this strategy. By forcing an Israeli pause and brokering a short Lebanon ceasefire, the US can credibly claim it restrained even its closest regional partner in the name of peace. That positions Washington as the reasonable actor, trying diplomacy first, while Iran continues harassing shipping, firing on merchant vessels, and violating the spirit of the ceasefire in and around Hormuz.
That asymmetry matters. It creates political space at home and abroad for tougher steps later if the talks fail. “We gave them a window. We restrained our friends. We kept our side of the bargain. They chose the hard way.” That’s a very different narrative than launching a major strike campaign while Israel is still visibly pounding Lebanon and Gaza.
Iran’s Business Model Is Resistance, Not Integration
One reason so much Western commentary feels off is that it still treats Iran like a normal state that wants what normal states want: integration, investment, growth. On that assumption, you can imagine a deal where Tehran trades away nuclear and Hormuz leverage for sanctions relief and a path back into the global economy. From a Western lens, that makes sense.
But that’s not the Iran that actually exists.
The Islamic Republic has spent more than forty years deliberately building a hardline, Sharia‑governed, closed system that looks more like North Korea than an oppressed emerging market desperate to join the WTO. Its leadership defines itself by maximalist disdain for “infidels,” enmity toward Western and especially Christian powers, and a global proxy network that treats terrorism and hybrid warfare as policy tools, not aberrations.
In that context, the “crown jewels” – nuclear capability and the ability to threaten the Strait of Hormuz – are not just bargaining chips. They are the regime’s ideological spine and its claim to being the spearpoint of hardline political Islam. Give those up in a verifiable, durable way and you don’t just lose leverage over oil; you begin to unravel the narrative that justified five decades of sacrifice, repression, and isolation. For the IRGC and the clerical hardliners who control the guns and the security services, that is closer to political suicide than to prudent compromise.
That’s why the standard “regime survival” argument is often backwards. Western analysis tends to assume the leadership will ultimately accept a painful deal to keep control. But control, in this system, is bound up with the very tools Washington wants dismantled. If you remove the nuclear threshold and Hormuz leverage, and you invite in inspectors, investors, and a freer flow of information, you’re not preserving the regime – you’re transforming it into something it was designed to prevent. If you’re sitting in IRGC headquarters, collapse reads more likely after that deal than before it.
The Limits of Diplomacy – And What Comes Next
This is where the “carousel” comes in: attack, pause, talk, pause, attack, repeat. As long as Iran’s core incentives are unchanged, the diplomatic track tends to generate reversible gestures – short ceasefires, temporary openings in the Strait, vague language about “guiding principles” – but not structural concessions on the nuclear program or Hormuz. Each cycle buys Tehran time. It keeps the shadow fleet moving, gives proxies room to maneuver, allows China and Russia to extract discounts and geopolitical leverage, and shifts the burden of escalation management back onto Washington.
That doesn’t mean coercion “doesn’t work.” It means partial, episodic coercion hasn’t been enough. If the US is serious about changing Iranian behavior on its non‑negotiables, the leverage package has to go beyond sporadic strikes on missile factories and one‑off interdictions. The logic, if you follow it through, points toward three interlocking lines of effort rather than one dramatic “power plant and bridge day”:
• Sustained economic strangulation, especially of the shadow fleet and IRGC‑linked revenue channels, to raise the cost of endurance for the hardliner patronage networks that actually matter.
• Systematic degradation of the Strait of Hormuz denial network – mines, coastal missile and drone infrastructure, logistics nodes, and the bridges and rail that allow Iran to surge kit to the coast.
• Information operations aimed at amplifying the regime’s internal contradictions and corruption, not in the hope of engineering a Hollywood coup, but to widen the gap between the costs ordinary Iranians bear and the ideological project their leaders are pursuing.
Even then, the probability of a clean “yes” on Washington’s current terms is low. More likely outcomes live toward the tails: a grudging, narrow technical arrangement that falls short of the crown jewels, or an escalation cycle that runs until Iran’s ability to threaten the Strait and sprint for a weapon is materially reduced in practice, even if not admitted on paper.
Why More Strikes Still Screen as the Base Case
None of this is an argument for or against war. It’s an attempt to be honest about where the road we are already on most likely leads. You can’t simultaneously insist that Iran surrender its nuclear leverage and its control over Hormuz, recognize that those tools are central to the regime’s identity, and then be surprised when polite negotiations in Islamabad don’t get you there.
From here, the path of least resistance still runs through more kinetic phases, not fewer. The blockade is not loosening; it’s tightening. The airlift and naval posture are not rotating home; they’re surging forward. Iran is not signaling genuine movement on the crown jewels; it’s reiterating red lines and toggling the Strait open and shut to demonstrate it still can. And the US political system, having now banked a Lebanon ceasefire and another high‑profile envoy trip, is better positioned to sell a return to strikes as reluctant necessity rather than eager choice.
In that sense, the question is less “Will there be another round of strikes?” than “How coherent and sustained will the next round be?” If the US uses the reload window to conduct another short, sharp demonstration and then climb back on the carousel, the structure of the problem still favors Tehran over time. If instead the US sees an extended campaign focused on economically and operationally disarming Iran’s ability to hold Hormuz and the nuclear threshold at risk – while consciously avoiding gratuitous civilian suffering – the balance of probabilities shifts.
You don’t have to want that outcome to acknowledge that most roads from here still point in that direction.
This piece will serve as one of our final iterations for the moment on Iran, barring material updates. We view the Iran conflict as the largest piece on the geopolitical table right now due to its knock‑on impacts. However, there are other developments in the world – some of which are related – that warrant attention as we think forward.
DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this note are my own and are based on publicly available information as of the date of writing. They are provided solely for informational and educational purposes to illustrate a decision‑making framework around geopolitical risk. Nothing herein should be construed as investment advice, a recommendation, or a solicitation to buy or sell any security, instrument, or strategy. Geopolitical and market outcomes are inherently uncertain, and forward‑looking views involve significant judgment that may prove incorrect. Any examples are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only. Readers should perform their own analysis, consider their specific objectives and constraints, and, where appropriate, consult with qualified professional financial advisors before making any decisions influenced by this material.