Iran’s Assembly of Experts met yesterday and issued a 10-point message supported by a vote of 62 out of 88 members. That vote and message answered the key question about Iran’s willingness to relinquish control of the Strait: it will not concede anything.
The Assembly of Experts is Iran’s highest clerical body, made up of 88 senior clerics. It is constitutionally empowered to select, supervise, and (in theory) remove the Supreme Leader. In practice, it serves as a key institutional check that reinforces the Supreme Leader’s authority, especially during periods of internal or external pressure.
Specifically, these three points from The Experts renders the MOU inoperable (points listed in order from Assembly of Experts statement):
Any breach of the MoU must be responded to immediately. Therefore, considering the continuation of ceasefire breaches by the Zionist regime in Lebanon, and the failure to withdraw from the occupied territories, the opening of the Strait of Hormuz is contrary to the obligations of the officials and is considered a major strategic mistake, and will only embolden the enemy to continue its breach of the agreement.
We remind you again that according to the obligatory guidance of the Supreme Leader, the country's nuclear rights should not be discussed nor disputed, and should be completely excluded from the negotiations.
Establishing management over the Strait of Hormuz, receiving compensation for war damages, the release of frozen assets, lifting all sanctions, and the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the region are inviolable demands of the Supreme Leader and the people, and they must be pursued. Any negligence in this regard will be met with a fierce reaction of the nation.
The statement specifically reinforces Iranian red lines on Strait control and nuclear enrichment. The practical impact is these points cannot be negotiated away in a manner that meets U.S. terms. These positions are backed by the Supreme Leader, the Experts, and IRGC leadership. These parties remain the functional levers of power in Iran and would control implementation of any deal.
Taken together, the comments suggest the MOU delivering a palatable outcome for the U.S. is effectively zero. The internal Iranian power dynamic has been at the foundation of this analytical series. Until the IRGC and the senior clerical establishment signal willingness to concede on core issues, a strong diplomatic outcome has always been low-probability. That remains true today and is reinforced at the highest levels of Iranian leadership.
As a result, we are faced with some uncomfortable observations:
Iran retains coercive control of the Strait, with multiple levers to pull that could materially damage the global economy.
The Strait is likely to be contested for the foreseeable future, with normalization far from imminent.
There typically is not an easy off-ramp to stop escalating conflict born out of recently failed diplomacy.
A path that avoids further escalation likely cedes control of the Strait to Iran, which is a dangerous precedent for international maritime chokepoints.
U.S. escalation likely results in a closed Strait, proxy activation, and, on the extreme end, attacks on G.C.C. energy infrastructure. Basically, it has the potential to deliver everything the U.S. doesn’t want.
The only means to return the Strait to freedom of navigation is the military option.
The last point is the most concerning.
For the U.S. to ensure “freedom of navigation” or to avoid setting a “dangerous precedent” on international waterways, it is effectively forced toward military action. The red lines now cast in stone by Iran’s senior decision-makers present no other realistic option — aside from U.S. willingness to concede defeat. This highlights the boxed-in position the U.S. faces. Escalating now invites the concerns that were rightfully avoided. Failure to escalate hands the Strait to Iran, which then creates the other undesirable outcomes.
We have talked for months about the negotiation path being the highest pain and lowest probability of success. The U.S. still seeks to avoid full escalation because of the associated resource drain and high-probability economic pain. As a result, the MOU path can and likely will continue to some extent, but without the support of the ultimate decision-makers in Iran it functionally buys time but can’t deliver a desirable outcome for the U.S. or G.C.C. nations. Iran has now made that clear.
This period now becomes more dangerous. Many cite proxies or “expansion” of the conflict as the major risks. Those are real and founded concerns, but a larger risk is the lack of a clear, obvious off-ramp via diplomacy should full-scale conflict return. To date, we have had ceasefires for talks and the MOU. The next phase of conflict likely won’t be able to lean on those features as easily or credibly. This creates a path to the oft mentioned “quagmire” the U.S. deeply wants to avoid.
The world has seen the U.S. and Iran escalate, de-escalate, talk, and shoot more. But now, absent a major breakthrough diplomatically tied to the U.S. or Iran conceding on stated red lines, the durable outcome will have to be produced militarily.
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