Some time has passed since the last 1963Macro note regarding Iran. In that time, not a great deal has changed in a measurable or functional sense. The United States has continued to move oil out of Hormuz under military cover, Iran has continued to shoot at shipping, the Houthis have continued their assault on KSA, and the war of words between all parties soldiers on. However, as we approach what will either be a return to negotiations, another “TACO”, or renewed hostilities, some developments are worth noting and frame what we may expect from here.
As reported over the last day, Israel discussed engaging in proactive strikes ahead of Israeli elections that are to be held tomorrow. Polls show a tight race with frequent projections of deadlock—neither bloc is comfortably projected to reach the 61 seats needed for a majority, and Eisenkot’s Yashar is reported to be competitive with or ahead of Likud as the largest single list. The probability that Netanyahu retains control is real but not certain. The strikes were allegedly halted over concerns Iran may retaliate heavily and disrupt the forthcoming Israeli election that will begin while America is largely still asleep this evening. Further reporting on military leadership support suggests the concerns were less about the action and more about the timing. To the time of this writing, no proactive engagement has reportedly come to pass.
Other recent reporting discussed POTUS seeking to engage Iran again following the U.S. midterm elections. A third US aircraft carrier is on its way to the region, the “airbridge” from Europe to West Africa has been steady and increasing in volume of late, and orders have been given to reduce non-essential personnel from U.S. Middle Eastern posts—including reporting today that non-essential personnel who were slated to be deployed to the region will no longer do so. The carrier group that is coming is intended to relieve one that is already on station, and other orders have been given for “evacuation” or movement of personnel out of the Middle East earlier in the conflict. Based on behavior, it seems that the United States is growing more serious about another round of larger military operations.
On the diplomacy side, we haven’t seen progress. Gulf states have either together or individually spoken with Iran (including quadrilateral discussions today in Tehran). Various GCC nations have for months issued statements promoting a return to diplomacy and also condemning Iranian and Houthi strikes on shipping and energy infrastructure. Both Iran and the United States have signaled they are open to talks, and talks are happening to some extent between intermediaries even if not bearing immediate results regarding Hormuz or the nuclear file.
For those negotiating efforts, Iran has stated that the U.S. position is “complete surrender” by Iran, which Iran has fully declined as an option. Iran subsequently offered seven points that are required to return to negotiations:
End to the war/hostilities on all fronts.
Release of frozen Iranian assets.
Lifting of the U.S. naval blockade.
Non-interference in Iran’s internal affairs.
Halt to strikes and attacks on Iranian territory.
Sanctions relief and oil-export measures.
Hormuz/regional security agreements—including the acceptance of the Iran/Oman Hormuz safe-passage arrangements.
In essence, Iran is asking for total surrender by another name.
This brings us to the diplomatic stalemate, and consistent nature of the conflict since prior to the most recent Trump/Xi summit. With much daylight between the parties on the negotiating front, a resumption of conflict appears likely absent a currently unforeseen diplomatic breakthrough (which can happen, and has happened). However, just today Secretary Bessent suggested that the Iranian people “stop paying taxes” in an effort to defund the IRGC regime. That comment suggests that at minimum item four above is not under consideration, and other actions like intermittent strikes on Iran’s Hormuz denial network or the expansion of Economic Fury further suggest the U.S. appetite for bending to Iranian demands is low to non-existent.
Against this backdrop, we are hours away from the Israeli elections and just outside a week away from those in the U.S. The U.S. media has been, logically, fixated on their domestic elections and treating the Israeli elections as a footnote. In most years, that’s true. In this case, however, the Israeli elections are likely as if not more impactful to the direction of this conflict than those in the United States. President Trump, in a Truth Social endorsement of Netanyahu, stated that if Israel has “the wrong Leader, which would be anyone other than Bibi, America will have to do this work ourselves, and I am not inclined to do so.” I read this as signaling limited appetite for a prolonged go-it-alone posture once the blockade and Economic Fury have had time to work. However, if Netanyahu retains power, the U.S. will have a known relationship and coalition to aggress Iran meaningfully. Said simply, if Netanyahu wins, the optionality of large-scale strikes remains unchanged as the U.S. administration would have known levels of support. If Netanyahu loses, strikes may still happen, but the scope of that engagement may look more restrained than an Epic Fury repeat. Said differently, this outcome may disrupt, gate, or reduce U.S. optionality in the conflict even if briefly, as President Trump effectively stated.
POTUS has also discussed a return to strikes following the upcoming U.S. elections. Politically, the current state of the conflict remains somewhat beneficial for Trump. With a week to go before the U.S. elections and the starkest contrast between political parties I’ve seen in my lifetime in America, it seems unlikely that much of anything that happens with Iran would have a major impact on the midterm elections absent apocalyptic levels of destruction. Meaning, the grinding status quo keeps the media attention away from Iran, President Trump focused on domestic issues and campaigning, and leaves the Iran file to be handled once domestic issues are resolved—all while falling back on the fact that crude flow has largely been restored (product is another matter, but for politics, crude flow is enough). Point being, POTUS can likely engage Iran and the political implications may be minimal as many minds are likely already made up, and further engagement with Iran seems unlikely to sway as many people one way or another than the broader media may suggest assuming the conflict looks like something we have seen before.
And this brings us to the expensive part of a settled war. As discussed previously in a like-named piece, Iran is suffering immensely economically. The U.S. and allied nations (if they are involved) represent a very meaningful amount of force. Said another way, if the United States and allies decide to use all tools in the arsenal to full capability the probabilities of ultimate success favor the aggressor in this instance. But, that is goal, not the path from here to there.
From here to there, we have some gates to clear before we likely see major changes in the direction of the conflict. In order:
Israeli elections
If Netanyahu is not reelected, this could change the course of the conflict materially. The U.S. has to establish understanding with the new leadership, and recalculate decision making around the potential for more of a “go-it-alone” frame. That doesn’t mean the U.S. won’t do that, nor does it mean Israel would fully abandon the U.S., but this development would likely be a headwind to preferred strike plans and create more cautious optionality for a period of time.
Post-Israeli elections rhetoric
If we can understand point one, the Iranians certainly can as well. If they know that Netanyahu will retain power, they also know that more conflict isn’t so much certainly coming as it is the willingness to engage is significantly higher. Iran has capitulated at a few points in this conflict with a desire to return to diplomacy and stop fighting or at least largely-respect a ceasefire. How the Iranians respond to this election both in rhetoric and action is important to watch for. If you’re Iran, the Israeli elections can be more important to you than American in a lot of ways, that is seemingly true now in the conflict period.
Interim period from post-Israeli elections to U.S. midterms
President Trump doesn’t appear to be speaking of Iran frequently on the campaign trail. From reporting, he hasn’t avoided the topic so much as moved on from it quickly: we have a blockade, we are choking them economically, that is working, prices will fall like a rock. He’s right about the blockade and economic components for Iran, but due to several oil-market reasons the “fall like a rock” depends on your definition of speed. Alongside this, now multiple intelligence assessments have noted that U.S. officials are potentially targets for various violent acts against them and that some of those plots are in “late stages”. That could be true, it might not be (convenient enough to warrant skepticism) but it is out there. Iran has shown restraint when it makes tactical sense. An assault on U.S. leadership, particularly on U.S. soil, would invite a whole-of-military response that would present Iran with a meaningful challenge. They know this, so the threat may be more useful than the implementation at this moment in time.
Post-midterm U.S. action
After the elections in the U.S., POTUS no longer has the constraint of politicking. Yes, there is 2028, but that is both a lifetime away and tomorrow in politics. For President Trump, his options are more open. This means either a negotiated surrender with Iran, withdrawal, a continuation of status-quo, or reengagement. Unless something changes, Iran is unlikely to negotiate their surrender, and the U.S. has signaled nothing but commitment. It seems we at minimum continue with the current level of hostilities, and at maximum see at least a brief return to Epic Fury levels of engagement. Escalate to deescalate living on.
It is here that the path to victory can become expensive. The United States and allies can likely defeat Iran, but as we have tracked for many months, and Iranian leadership has stated plainly, they will fight to the end and make the cost of victory for anyone who engages them as high as possible. Until I have reason to believe that isn’t the case, it remains the baseline. Whether that is proxies, cells, aligned organizations, missiles, allies, or weapons unknown, I would expect Iran to use all of it if the conflict were to return to Epic Fury levels of engagement with a wider target set than we have seen to this point in the war. That probably comes with great cost to Iran after the engagement too, but in the forthcoming scenario thinking may become more existential than not.
We will have more clarity on the first of the above gates in the next 24 hours, and that will be notably informative.
I’ll be back with additional notes as we move through the gates.
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